This paper analyzes the pattern of occupational change in four Western European countries over the last two decades: what kind of jobs have been expanding -highpaid jobs, low-paid jobs or both? By addressing this issue, we also examine what theoretical account is consistent with the observed pattern of change: skill-biased technical change, skill supply evolution or wage-setting institutions? Our empirical findings show a picture of massive occupational upgrading that closely matches educational expansion. In all four countries, by far the strongest employment growth occurred at the top of the occupational hierarchy, among managers and professionals. Yet in parallel, in Britain and Switzerland, as well as in Germany and Spain after 1996 and 2002 respectively, relative employment declined more strongly in the middling occupations (among clerks and production workers) than at the bottom (among interpersonal service workers). This slightly polarized pattern of occupational upgrading is consistent with the 'routinization' hypothesis that technology is a better substitute for average-paid jobs in production and the office than for low-paid jobs in interpersonal services. However, we find large crosscountry differences in the employment evolution at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, among low-paid service workers: sizeable growth in Britain and Spain, but stagnation in Germany and Switzerland. This results points towards the possibility that wage-setting institutions filter the pattern of occupational change.
Introduction
At the end of the 1990s, a consensus emerged among labour market researchers that affluent countries were witnessing an ongoing process of occupational upgrading. The available evidence for Western Europe and the U.S clearly suggested that high-skilled occupations were expanding at the expense of low-skilled occupations (e.g. Berman et al., 1998; Gallie et al., 1998; Maurin and Thesmar, 2004) . However, this consensus view was shattered in the last few years by three influential studies finding an increasing polarization of the employment structure in the United States (Wright and Dwyer, 2003; Autor et al., 2008) and Great Britain (Goos and Manning, 2007) . These authors argued that over the last two decades, employment growth in the U.S. and Britain had taken place both in high-paid professional and managerial jobs and in lowpaid personal service jobs, whereas employment in average-paid production and office jobs was declining. Three explanations potentially account for this puzzling finding of a polarizing employment structure in the United States and Britain. A first explanation focuses on labour demand and puts forward a more nuanced theory of skill-biased technological change where computers are both complementary to high-skilled analytical and lowskilled interpersonal tasks, while substituting for mid-skilled manual and clerical tasks (Autor et al., 2003 (Autor et al., , 2008 Manning, 2004) . A second explanation emphasizes changes in labour supply and highlights -for the United States -the slowdown in skill supply growth due to slower educational expansion (Goldin and Katz, 2007) and increasing Hispanic immigration (Wright and Dwyer, 2003) . A third explanation brings in institutions and considers the creation of low-paid jobs and the resulting employment polarization a distinctive feature of the Anglo-Saxon countries' flexible wage-setting institutions (Scharpf, 2000; OECD, 2004) .
Our paper wishes to contribute to this debate by examining the pattern of occupational change for four Western European countries with very different institutions: Britain, Germany, Spain and Switzerland. The central question we address
is to know what kind of jobs have been expanding (or declining) over the last two 1 These findings of a polarizing employment structure have received all the more attention as they are remarkably consistent with the evolution of U.S. wage inequality in the 1990s, marked by rising uppertail, but stable lower-tail inequality (Lemieux, 2008). decades: high-paid jobs, low-paid jobs or both? Is occupational polarization limited to the Anglo-Saxon countries or is it a pervasive feature of post-industrial labour markets? So far, findings in the literature do not convey a clear cut picture. If the quality of jobs is measured in terms of skills, results point towards unambiguous occupational upgrading for Britain (Gallie, 2002; Felstead et al., 2007) and Switzerland (Sacchi et al., 2005; Sheldon, 2005) . For Germany, conclusions diverge between occupational upgrading (Kern, 1998) and polarized upgrading (Spitz-Oener, 2006) , where high-skilled jobs expanded strongly and low-skilled jobs moderately relative to mid-skilled jobs. Analyses for Spain show that over the last thirty years, not only the numbers of professionals have strongly increased, but -if to a weaker extentalso those of low-skilled service workers (Bernardi and Garrido, 2008) . If the quality of jobs is measured based on occupations' average earnings, studies find a trend towards polarization that is weak in Germany (Dustmann et al., forthcoming) , but relatively marked in Britain (Goos and Manning, 2007) . Finally, two recent studies based on the European Labour Force Survey diverge in their findings, one reporting a pervasive evolution towards polarization (Goos et al., 2009) , the other one showing large country differences that nonetheless suggest a common trend towards upgrading (Eurofound, 2008) .
We analyze the pattern of occupational change between 1990 and 2008 on the basis of large individual-level country surveys. The comparative setting of our study provides us with insight of two different kinds. Firstly, by using the same methodological framework and time periods for four countries, we produce comparable cross-country results. Secondly, by confronting the implications of the different explanations of occupational change with the data, we examine what theoretical accounts are consistent with the observed pattern of occupational change.
Typically, technological change is pervasive and should produce a similar pattern of occupational upgrading or polarization across Western European countries. In contrast, wage-setting institutions and, to a lesser extent, skill supply evolution vary from country to country and should lead to different patterns of employment change.
Our findings show a picture of massive occupational upgrading. In all four countries, by far strongest employment growth occurred at the top of the occupational hierarchy, among managers and professionals. In parallel to growth at the top, relative employment declined more strongly in the middling occupations than at the bottom in Britain, Switzerland and -after 1996 or 2002 respectively -in Germany and Spain. Contrary to these country similarities, we find large cross-national differences in the employment evolution at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, among low-paid service workers: sizeable growth in Britain and Spain, but stagnation in Germany and Switzerland.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the three competing explanations of occupational change mentioned. The dominant theoretical accounts include technological change on the demand-side, skill evolution on the supply side and wage-setting institutions as intervening factor. In section 3, we present the data and discuss our analytical strategy to examine occupational change. Evidence of the pattern of occupational change -first over the last two decades, then over subperiods of six years -is shown in section 4 and discussed with respect to technical change.
Section 5 controls for changes in educational attainment and compares the observed pattern of occupational change with the pattern of change predicted on the sole basis of skill supply evolution. Moreover, we also look at another source of change in labour supply, namely immigration. Section 6 tries to make sense of the observed pattern of employment change by focussing on institutional explanations and thus looking whether different countries have created jobs in different occupational categories.
Section 7 concludes by discussing the policy implications of our findings.
Theoretical accounts of occupational change
Transformations in the occupational structure are always the result of the interaction between demand and supply-side factors in a given institutional context. This interaction makes the isolation of a single driving force of occupational change an intricate task and has two implications for our study: Firstly, it implies that we will be better equipped to provide descriptive evidence of the pattern of occupational change than to explain its causes. Secondly, in order to have at least some explanatory leverage, it implies the necessity of clearly specifying what empirical evidence is consistent or inconsistent with different explanatory accounts. We begin our discussion of explanations of occupational change by schematically dividing them into three accounts: (i) demand-side accounts, (ii) supply-side accounts and (iii) institutional accounts.
(i) Demand-side accounts of occupational change: technical change
In the long run, the main driving force behind changes in the tasks humans do in their jobs is technology (Manning 2004) . In comparison, other demand-side factors such as international trade or shifts in product demand may at best play a modest role in accounting for changes in the employment structure (OECD, 2005) . Until recently, the dominant explanation has been skill-biased technical change (SBTC), which expects the spread of computer-based technology to increase the demand for high-skilled workers relative to low-skilled workers. Through the automation of production processes and clerical tasks, SBTC implies an unambiguous upgrading of the occupational structure.
In the last few years, the explanation invoking skill-biased technical change has been challenged by the "routinization" hypothesis (Autor et al., 2003; Manning, 2004) .
The central argument involves a re-specification of the types of jobs that are most likely to be replaced by technology. While machines cannot easily substitute for many non-routine interactive tasks such as restaurant waiting, care giving or cleaning that are set at the very bottom of the occupational hierarchy, they readily take over the routine production and clerical tasks typically done in middle-range jobs. Accordingly, computerized technology seems complementary to both high-paid analytical and lowpaid interactive jobs. Technical change is then not expected to lead to overall occupational upgrading, but rather to the hollowing out of the middle and hence to polarized growth in the employment structure (Goos and Manning 2007) .
Explaining transformation of the occupational structure with technical change is plausible. Yet the technical-change thesis has the problem that the fundamental explanatory force is largely unobserved, a sort of unmeasured force producing pervasive change (DiPrete and McManus 1996: 39) . The two hypotheses of SBTC and of routinization have in common the view that the broad trends of occupational change will be very similar across advanced economies.
2 An adequate test of this hypothesis must thus involve cross-country comparisons: SBTC and routinization are pervasive and should thus be visible in all four countries under study -either as clear cut upgrading for SBTC or as polarized growth at the top and the bottom at the expense of the middle for routinization.
(ii) Supply-side accounts of occupational change: skill composition
Unlike demand-side accounts that expect very similar patterns of change across countries, supply-side explanations anticipate cross-national variation in occupational change. This variation is explained with country differences both in the evolution and characteristics of labour supply (Nickell and Bell, 1996; Freeman and Schettkat, 2001 ). The idea is that firms determine their production techniques and the jobs they create on the basis of available input factors, among others the supply of skills. While the increase in the demand for skills -largely due to technology -is relatively stable over time, growth in the supply of skills varies depending on the evolution of educational attainment and immigration (Goldin and Katz, 2007 Switzerland the share of workers with medium levels of education declined somewhat faster than that of low-skilled workers.
Switzerland being somewhat more advanced. In contrast, Spain was clearly less advanced in 1990, but has made up much ground since. In theory, the evolution of countries' educational attainment, shown in columns
(1) to (3) in Based on these changes in the workforce's skill composition, we expect marked occupational upgrading in all four countries: everywhere, the numbers of high-skilled workers have strongly expanded relative to those of medium-and low-skilled workers.
Expectations of occupational upgrading are least ambiguous for Germany and Spain.
In contrast, in Switzerland, skill supplies have decreased somewhat faster in the middle than at the bottom of the skill distribution. In Britain, the sizeable increase in immigration has possibly compensated, to some extent, the decline of low-skilled labour supply. Hence, for these two countries, a slightly polarized version of occupational upgrading -with strong growth at the top and a slower decline at the bottom than the middle of the employment structure -seems consistent with a supplybased explanation.
(iii) Institutional accounts: wage-setting institutions
A third and last explanation insists on the fact that in labour markets, demand-and supply-side factors are channelled through institutional mechanisms (DiPrete and McManus, 1996; Levy and Temin, 2007) . In this view, polarization in the employment structure only happens if low-paid service jobs are created in substantial numbers.
However, creation of such jobs in hotels and restaurants, supermarkets and cleaning, care of the elderly and children strongly depends on relative wages: where wagesetting institutions compress the wage structure and decrease wage flexibility, interpersonal service jobs become too expensive and may simply not be created (Krugman, 1994; Iversen and Wren, 1998; Scharpf, 2000 ; for a critical discussion: Salverda and Schettkat, 2007) . In the same vein, relatively high minimum wages -by making the creation of low-skilled jobs less profitable -may induce firms to create more high-skilled jobs and thus improve the composition of jobs (Acemoglu, 2001 ).
Hence, a common shift in labour demand -due for instance to technical change -may have very different effects on countries' occupational structure, depending on wagesetting institutions.
In table 2, we compare the wage-setting institutions of the four countries by looking at measures of collective bargaining, unemployment insurance benefits and wage inequality. In terms of coverage with collective agreements, Germany and Spain have a somewhat more protected (and hence probably less flexible) wage structure than Switzerland and Britain. With respect to the unemployment insurance (and hence the reservation wage), Britain stands out as having by far the lowest benefit level, while Switzerland's insurance is slightly more generous than that of Germany and Spain. If we compare measures of wage inequality at the beginning of the period under study, we find Switzerland and Germany to have a more compressed wage structure than Britain and Spain. This result holds regardless whether we look at overall wage inequality or only at lower-tail wage inequality.
Based on these indicators of wage-setting institutions, the probability of lowskilled service workers being priced out by high relative wages seems greater in Germany than in Britain, while Spain and Switzerland occupy an intermediate position. Hence, according to the institutional thesis, polarization of the occupational structure due to the creation of low-wage service jobs seems most likely in Britain and least probable in Germany. When summarizing the expectations stemming from the different explanations, we can limit our attention to the two aspects that are controversial. Undisputed is the expectation that strongest employment growth will take place in the high-skilled occupations. In contrast, expectations diverge with respect to (a) the evolution of lowskilled relative to mid-skilled jobs and (b) the evolution of low-paid service employment relative to total employment. While the SBTC hypothesis expects for all countries a negative change on both dimensions (less relative growth in low-skilled than in mid-skilled jobs, slower growth in low-paid services than in total employment), the exact opposite applies to the hypothesis of routinization. The skill supply hypothesis expects much faster growth of mid-skilled relative to low-skilled occupations in Germany and Spain, but not in Britain and Switzerland. Finally, the institutional hypothesis predicts stronger growth for low-paid services than for total employment in Britain, but not in Germany -Spain and Switzerland being indeterminate.
Data and strategy of analysis
Our analysis of occupational change over the last two decades in Britain, Germany, Rank-ordering occupations into quintiles: Once we have calculated the median earning of each occupation over the period of interest, we rank-order the around 150
occupations from the lowest median earning up to the highest median earning. These rank-ordered occupations are then grouped into five equally large quintiles, containing as close as possible to 20% of total employment at the beginning of the time period under study. 7 The bottom quintile thus holds the 20% of employment in the occupations with the lowest median earnings. In the period under study, this quintile 1 includes in Germany, among others, waiters, personal care workers, shop salespersons, hairdressers, sewers, domestic helpers and cleaners. Likewise, we obtain in the highest 5 For the smallest sample in our study, the SOEP, we make sure that an occupation's median earning is reliable by also using intermediate years to calculate occupations' median earnings: the year at the beginning (1990), then every third year in the middle (1993, 1996 , and so on) up to the year at the end of the time period (2007). However, occupations' rankings strongly correlate over time: hairdressers, farm hands and waiters are always situated near the bottom, dentists, corporate managers and attorneys always near the top of the earnings distribution. 6 The 1989 and 2006 surveys were carried out by Spain's Centre for Sociological Research. They contain detailed occupational and earnings information on about 6,700 and 3,600 individuals, respectively. The 1990 survey was part of Erik Wright's international comparative class project and has 2900 valid cases. 7 Since occupations come in lumpy units, rank-ordered occupations are aggregated into groups containing as close as possible to 20% of employment, but not exactly 20% (but rather 19.2% or 20.7%). However, all results shown below are corrected for these deviations.
quintile 5 the 20% of employment in the occupations with the highest median earnings. In Germany, these occupations comprise, among others, medical doctors, civil engineers, legal professionals, computer professionals, chief executives, sales and marketing managers. The pattern of occupational change is now determined on the basis of how occupations in these quintiles evolve in terms of relative employment over the period under study.
It must be noted that we only resort to wages in order to rank-order occupations.
The focus of our analysis lies on the quantity side in the labour market -employment -and not on the price side -wages. Accordingly, we are not examining change in wage inequality, but change of employment in more or less well-paid occupations grouped into quintiles.
Findings for the pattern of occupational change, 1990-2008
Before looking at changes in the size of the different job quality quintiles, we present of table 3 shows for each occupation the corresponding job quality quintile.
Schematically, the occupations with the biggest employment gains over the last two decades can be divided into two large categories: on the one hand, a category comprising professional and managerial occupations set in (private) business services such as financial managers, legal and computer professionals; on the other hand, a group including occupations set in (public) social services such as health care employees, educational specialists and social workers. Within these two categories, particularly strong has been the expansion of computer professionals and (assistant)
nursing staff -and this in all four countries. Hence, care assistants or nursing associate professionals respectively were the occupation number 1 in terms of employment gains in Britain, occupation number 2 in Germany, occupation number 3 in Spain and occupation number 7 in Switzerland. Likewise, computer professionals were the fourth occupation in terms of growth in Britain, the sixth occupation in Germany and the second in Switzerland. Among the ten occupations with strongest employment growth, a majority (6 out of 10 in Britain and Switzerland) -or at least a sizeable minority (3 and 4 out of 10 in Germany and Spain) -are set in the highest-paying job quality quintile 5. Yet at the same time, among the three occupations with greatest employment gains, two (care and educational assistants) fall into the lowest-paying quintile 1 in Britain and one (office and hotel cleaners) in Spain. When examining the five occupations with strongest employment decline over the last two decades (table 4) , we can distinguish again two groups: craft workers such as mechanics and toolmakers on the one hand, office clerks and secretaries on the other.
As predicted by the routinization hypothesis, these strongly declining clerical and craft occupations are neither the least-skilled nor the least-paid. Accordingly, they are mostly set in quintiles 3 and 4. However, alongside these middling occupations, strong employment decrease has also taken place in the very menial occupations of small vehicle drivers, agricultural, manufacturing and service labourers, all set in the lowest quintile 1. Spain is somewhat of an exception where IT-professionals were not among the ten most strongly growing occupations and where a clerical subcategory -cashiers and tellers with direct client-contact -did not decrease, but strongly increase.
Combined with the strong decline in farmers, agricultural workers and shopkeepers since 1990, this occupational pattern suggests that Spain has embarked later on a process of economic modernization than the other three countries.
In a next step, we display in figure 1 Secondly, employment declined the most in the middling quintile 3 in both Britain and Switzerland, whereas in Germany and Spain the decrease was stronger in the lowest-paid occupations of quintile 1.
Thirdly, we can clearly discard the hypothesis of occupational downgrading over the last two decades for all four countries. To the contrary, we obtain the picture of occupational upgrading that is clearcut in Germany and -with the exception of the somewhat stronger decline in quintile 3 and 4 respectively -even more marked in Switzerland and Spain. Results are more contrasted for Britain, suggesting a pattern of "polarized upgrading" with very strong employment growth at the top of the occupational hierarchy, substantial losses in the middle and very slight growth at the bottom. We thus obtain for Britain a pattern of occupational change over the period 1991-2008 that is remarkably similar to that found in earlier studies covering different periods: 1979 -1999 (Goos and Manning, 2007 : 121), 1993 -1999 (OECD, 2003 and 1995 (Eurofound, 2008 .
Fourthly, unlike Goos, Manning and Salomons (2009) but consistent with
Eurofound (2008), we find sizeable country differences: while the best-paid occupations expanded in all four countries, we do not find the patent cross-national similarities predicted by either the SBTC-or the routinization-hypothesis with respect to the lower half of the occupational structure. SBTC describes well the upgrading process observed in Germany and Spain, whereas routinization closely fits the pattern of polarization in Britain and, to a lesser extent, in Switzerland. Spain, 1990 Switzerland, 1991 Differences in countries' occupational trajectories are possibly due to the fact that the impact of technological change on the employment structure evolved over time, leading to a gradual shift from upgrading to polarization. Depending on whether this evolution started earlier or later in a country, it may not show in an overview of two decades. To test this argument, we examine occupational change for the four countries under study over three six-year subperiods (see figure 2) .
These results suggest that a transition from clear cut occupational upgrading to more polarized change has taken place in all four countries studied. The first subperiod 1990-1996 -marked by a sharp international recession and a strong rise in unemployment -coincides in all four countries with very strong growth in , 1991-2008 Note: change in quintiles' relative employment is predicted based on the evolution of 24 education-age groups. Assuming an unchanged distribution of education-age groups within a given quintile between 1990 and 2008, relative change in each quintile's share is predicted on the basis of the employment evolution of the 24 education-age groups.
Switzerland
Hence, while skill supply and occupational structure have evolved in a surprisingly similar manner, both substantial loss of middling jobs and relative stability of low-paid jobs run contrary to predictions based on skill supplies. Above all Britain's and, to a lesser extent, Spain's skill evolution would lead us to expect a much larger decline in low-paid occupations than what we find -unless the parallel rise in immigration had an impact on low-paid labour supply that is not adequately captured by formal educational attainment figures. This is likely to be the case. The reason is that new immigrants are often unable to put their human capital into immediate use because of language barriers, information deficiencies and discrimination. Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008) thus show for Britain that immigrants tend to downgrade upon arrival and to compete with native workers at much lower occupational levels than expected by their educational attainment.
Hence, strong surges in immigration as those experienced in Britain and Spain since the end of the 1990s may create the labour supply necessary to fill low-paid jobs of quintile 1. In Britain, the large inflow of foreign workers possibly explains the relative stability at the bottom of the employment structure -which is in contradiction with the strong decrease of low-skilled labour supply. We test this argument by disaggregating net change in employment for four different nationality-gender groups:
national men, national women, foreign men and foreign women. Table 5 shows the net the slight tendency towards occupational polarization, defined as a stronger decline in medium-paid relative to low-paid jobs, is exclusively due to the employment trajectory of national men. In contrast, in Britain, all four nationality-gender groups have undergone a polarizing pattern of change where job growth has been stronger at the bottom and the top than in the middle. Hence, although immigrants contributed to the polarization of Britain's employment structure, they were not the only driving force. A second parallel concerns the strongly decreasing employment share of production workers, evident in all four countries. In Britain and Germany, these relative job losses were distributed quite equally across quintiles 1 to 4, whereas in Spain and Switzerland production workers' relative employment fell most strongly in the bottom quintile.
A third similarity concerns the falling share of office clerks in Britain, Germany and Switzerland. Since clerical jobs have mainly disappeared from quintile 3 (and, to a lesser degree, from quintiles 2 and 4), the relative reduction of office clerks is responsible for the observed trough in the middle of the employment structure. The relative decline in clerical employment was very substantial in Britain and, above all, in Switzerland, where the share of clerks in the workforce dropped by 7.7 percentage points (as compared to 4.1 in Britain). Contrary to the other three countries, clerks' employment share remained stable in Spain and thus did not contribute to relative job decline in the middle quintile. This stability in back office jobs may reflect a slower rate of computerization and hence, possibly, lagged economic development.
The trajectory of interpersonal service and sales workers stands in stark contrast to these broad similarities. While the employment share of these mostly low-skilled service jobs remained unchanged in Germany and Switzerland, Britain and Spain witnessed a substantial increase. In Spain, this expansion took place above all in the lowest-paid quintile 1, but also in quintiles 2 and 4. In contrast, growth of interpersonal service jobs in Britain was almost exclusively concentrated in the bottom quintile 1. These results for different occupational groups explain why we see a more or less marked tendency towards polarization in the four countries under study. While the fall in clerical employment has led to comparatively stronger job growth at the bottom than the middle of the occupational structure in Britain, Germany and Switzerland, expansion of low-paid jobs was conditional on growth in interpersonal service jobs -a condition only met in Britain and, to a lesser extent, Spain. We can now summarize our findings and come back to our initial hypotheses. To begin with, both skill-biased technical change (SBTC) and skill supply evolution predict a similar pattern of clear cut occupational upgrading across countries. Hence, they grasp the big picture in all four countries, most clearly so in Germany. At the same time, while SBTC and skill supply evolution describe the general tendency, they fail to account for the strong employment loss in the middling occupations. To explain this trough in the middle, we need the refined theory of technological change provided by the routinization hypothesis: technology has been more successful in substituting for clerical and production jobs than for interpersonal service occupations. While the former -above of all clerical jobs -cluster in the middle range of the occupational hierarchy in terms of pay, the latter are set at the very bottom. Hence, we see a stronger employment decline in the middle than in the bottom-paid occupations, leading to the slightly polarized pattern of upgrading predicted by routinization.
Yet there is an important objection to this explanation: the routinization hypothesis has been developed on the basis of empirical findings for job change in the United States (Autor et al., 2003 , Autor et al., 2008 and Britain (Goos and Manning, 2007) we observe in all four countries a collapse of middling jobs in quintiles 2 and 3 (Spain prior to 1996 being an exception), relative growth in quintile 1 only took place in Britain, the country where the low-wage sector is least sheltered from market pressure.
This finding points towards the possibility that different country institutions channel technological change into a more or less polarized pattern of occupational upgrading.
Conclusions
The objective of this paper has been to analyze the pattern of occupational change in four Western European countries. What kind of jobs have been expanding (or declining) over the last two decades: high-paid jobs, low-paid jobs or both? By addressing this issue, our paper also tried to examine what theoretical account is consistent with the observed pattern of change: skill-biased technical change, skill supply evolution or wage-setting institutions?
Our findings reveal two constant features across the four countries studied. Firstly, we obtain everywhere a picture of massive occupational upgrading. In all four countries, by far the strongest employment growth occurred at the top of the occupational hierarchy, among managers and professionals. Over the last two decades, educational expansion and occupational upgrading seem to have gone hand in hand in all four countries. This is clearly the case in Germany and Switzerland, while educational advance may have slightly outpaced occupational upgrading in Britain and, above all, Spain. Secondly, in parallel to growth at the top, our analysis indicates that in Britain and Switzerland, as well as Germany after 1996 and Spain after 2002, relative employment declined more strongly in average-paid jobs (among clerks and some production workers) than in low-paid jobs (where most interpersonal service workers can be found). In particular in Britain the decrease in clerks' relative employment led to a drastic fall in the middling occupations.
Hence, we find a general thrust towards occupational upgrading -particularly marked in Germany and Spain -that is both consistent with the evolution of skills on the supply side and a skill-biased version of technological change (SBTC) on the demand side. Yet without turning to the routinization hypothesis of technical change, we cannot explain the trough in the middle of the employment structure. Solely based on change in the supply of skills, we would have expected a smaller decline in the share of average-paid jobs, but a larger fall in the share of low-paid jobs. The polarized pattern of occupational upgrading observed for Britain and Switzerland (as well as for Germany after 1996 and for Spain after 2002) is consistent with the idea that technology is a better substitute for average-paid jobs in production and the office than for low-paid jobs in interpersonal services.
At the same time, we find sizeable cross-country differences in the employment evolution at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy that run contrary to accounts of pervasive technical change. Low-paid interpersonal service jobs have expanded significantly in Britain and, somewhat less so, in Spain, but stagnated in Germany and Switzerland. A potential explanation may be that wage-setting institutions filter the pattern of occupational change: countries possibly only experience a trend towards polarization if wage-setting institutions facilitate the creation of low-paid interpersonal service jobs. Our evidence suggests that this may be the case in Britain, but not in Germany.
What are the implications of our findings? On the one hand, they prompt optimism: the number of 'lovely' jobs has clearly grown much faster than that of 'lousy' jobs and we can unambiguously discard the hypothesis of occupational downgrading for the period since 1990. On the other hand, the strong fall in the middle of the occupational structure may be cause for pessimism. Wright and Dwyer's (2003: 322) concern about low-paid workers' declining opportunities for upward mobility in the American labour market may also apply to Western Europe. Notes: The target population is defined as individuals aged 18-65 who work at least 20 hours per week. Data on work income are used to rank-order occupations from the lowest-paid to the highest paid depending on an occupation's median earning. In the British LFS, information on earnings was only asked to respondents of one out of six waves between 1992 and 1996. From 1997 onwards, earnings data is available for two out of six waves. Note: Job quality quintile 1 contains at the beginning of the period the 20% of employment set in the occupations with the lowest median earnings, job quality quintile 5 the 20% of employment set in the occupations with the highest median earnings.
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